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1. Introduction  
The case of Dean v. Lord Advocate concerned a request, made by the government of 
the Republic of China in Taiwan (“ROC”), for the extradition of a UK national to Taiwan 
in connection with serious criminal offences committed there, for which he was 
convicted and sentenced, by the ROC’s municipal courts, in 2011 and 2012. The 
extradition request was made pursuant to an ad hoc Memorandum of Understanding 
(“MOU”), concluded between the ROC and UK governments in 2013, solely for this 
purpose (a bilateral treaty being out of the question as the UK government does not 
recognise the ROC as a de jure State or government). The MOU’s conclusion attracted 
widespread attention in Taiwan because it was the first time that the ROC had entered 
into an extradition arrangement with a State. In its 2015 and 2016 judgments, the 
Scottish Appeal Court had to grapple with a number of difficult issues located at the 
margins of the legal regimes engaged by the case, namely, UK law, the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“ECHR”) 
and general international law.1 The case’s importance stems from the Appeal Court’s 
answers to the following key questions. First, did Taiwan have sufficient legal 
personality to qualify as a “territory” for the purposes of the UK’s Extradition Act 2003? 
Secondly, what was the status and effect of the 2013 MOU, and the diplomatic 
                                                 
* Dr Stephen Allen, BA, LLM, PhD, Barrister. Senior Lecturer, Department of Law, Queen Mary, 
University of London: s.r.allen@qmul.ac.uk. I would like to thank the Yearbook’s anonymous reviewer 
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1 (1950) 5 European Treaty Series. The first judgment of the Scottish Appeal Court in Dean v. Lord 
Advocate was delivered on 24 June 2015: [2015] HCJAC 52; [2015] SLT 419. The second judgment 
was delivered on 23 September 2016 [2016] HCJAC 83: [2016] SCL 84. References to particular 
paragraphs of the two judgments will be included in the text of this essay. 
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assurances contained therein (and those given subsequently), as a matter of 
international law? Thirdly, and most significantly, what are the parameters of the 
ECHR’s jurisprudence concerning the application of the non-refoulement principle2 
when a non-Convention country seeks the extradition of an individual who is within a 
Contracting State’s jurisdiction? 
The absolute character of the prohibition on torture, inhuman and degrading 
treatment is well-entrenched.3 However, the existence of a severity threshold for the 
purpose of establishing proscribed behaviour has meant that, in practice, what 
qualifies as ill-treatment has acquired a circumstantial dimension, in certain respects. 
As a result, behaviour which may qualify as ill-treatment in one national (or regional) 
setting might be tolerated in another geographical situation for a range of structural, 
cultural and resource-based reasons. Different perspectives regarding the correct 
approach have led to a normative conflict between the absolute and relativist 
interpretations of the prohibition on ill-treatment. In these circumstances, this essay 
will harness the issues raised by Dean v Lord Advocate to highlight the tensions that 
exist between national, regional and international legal regimes (and between law and 
politics more generally) in extradition cases which involve the application of the non-
refoulement principle and which engage the ECHR’s provisions. In particular, it will 
examine the extent to which the government and courts of a Contracting State may be 
justified in imposing Convention standards on a non-Convention country. In addition, 
in recent years, MOUs have become increasingly popular for the purpose of 
concluding extradition arrangements and diplomatic assurances have become a 
                                                 
2 The non-refoulement principle holds that no State shall expel, return (“refouler”) or extradite an 
individual to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he or she would at risk 
of being subjected to torture, inhuman, or degrading treatment. See section 3.1., below.   
3 Article 3 of the ECHR provides that: ‘No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment’. 
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favoured means by which requested Contracting States have sought to protect the 
Convention rights of given individuals in extradition cases. However, both MOUs and 
diplomatic assurances are widely regarded as non-legal devices, as far as 
international law is concerned. The blurring of international law and politics with regard 
to the apparatus and operation of extradition has given rise to legitimate concerns 
about not only the manner in which the human rights of individuals who are subject to 
extradition requests are protected but also how the legal rights and obligations of 
States are maintained through the international legal order. It is suggested that the 
significance of these general concerns is illuminated in the present case due to the 
existence of persisting doubts about Taiwan’s international legal status.  
Against this background, the essay will examine the Appeal Court’s first 
decision in Dean v. Lord Advocate (“the 2015 judgment”) with a view to determining 
whether Taiwan qualified as a “territory” for the purposes of the application of § 194 of 
the UK’s Extradition. The essay will then focus on the Appeal Court’s second decision 
in this case. The 2016 judgment was solely concerned with whether Dean’s extradition 
to serve out his sentence in Taipei prison would put him in danger of suffering ill-
treatment, contrary to Article 3 of the ECHR. Accordingly, the third section will examine 
the relevant law concerning the principle of non-refoulement and its application in the 
context of the ECHR. In turn, it will scrutinise the arguments canvassed in the majority 
Opinions of Lady Paton and Lady Clark and the dissenting Opinion of Lord Drummond 
Young. The penultimate part will explore the case’s wider importance for the 
development of the non-refoulement principle in cases involving non-ECHR countries; 
the practice of concluding MOUs and using diplomatic assurances in such situations; 




2. The 2015 Appeal Court Judgment 
2.1. Background and Applicable Law 
Zain Taj Dean, a British national, was involved in a road traffic accident in Taipei, 
Taiwan, on 25 March 2010.4 His car hit a motorcyclist who was killed as a result. The 
deceased was a young man who had been delivering newspapers. Dean was arrested 
and prosecuted in connection with this fatal accident. In March 2011, he was 
convicted, by the District Court of Taipei, of drink-driving, negligent manslaughter and 
leaving the scene of an accident. He was sentenced to two and a half years 
imprisonment. He appealed, unsuccessfully, against conviction and sentence to the 
High Court of Taiwan whereupon his sentence was increased to four years. He was 
granted conditional bail pending an appeal to the Supreme Court of Taiwan. But, in 
August 2012, Dean absconded while on bail. He fled to Scotland, using a friend’s 
passport. The Supreme Court of Taiwan upheld his convictions and sentence, in 
absentia, on 20 December 2012.  
In February 2013, the ROC’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs contacted the UK 
government with a view to seeking Dean’s extradition to Taiwan. On 9 October 2013, 
the Director-General of the Department of International Affairs in the ROC’s Ministry 
of Justice issued a provisional arrest warrant.5 On 16 October 2013, a MOU was 
concluded between the ROC’s Ministry of Justice and the UK government’s Home 
Office concerning the arrangements for Dean’s extradition to Taiwan. On 16 October 
2013, the Edinburgh District Court issued a warrant for his arrest. Dean was 
subsequently arrested and kept in custody pending the resolution of this matter. On 
                                                 
4 Dean was born on 10 January 1971. It has been reported that he had been living in Taiwan for some 
19 years before the accident and that he was a business consultant. See ‘British Citizen Goes on the 
Run with Fake Passport in Taiwan’, The Telegraph, 30 January 2013. 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/taiwan/9836278/British-citizen-goes-on-the-run-with-
fake-passport-in-Taiwan.html (last visited Jan. 16, 2017) 
5 As required by §73 and §74 of the Extradition Act 2003, c.41 (U.K). 
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28 October 2013, the Director-General in the ROC’s Ministry of Justice made a formal 
request to the Home Secretary regarding Dean’s extradition. On 18 November 2013, 
the extradition request was certified by the Scottish Ministers.6 On 23 December 2013, 
the ROC’s Director-General made certain undertakings regarding the time Dean had 
already served in a Scottish prison in connection with the offences in question; that 
the sentence would not be increased on his return to Taiwan; and that the death 
penalty would not be imposed. On 11 June 2014, the presiding Sheriff at the Edinburgh 
District Court ruled that Dean must be extradited to Taiwan.7 Following this decision, 
on 1 August 2014, the Scottish Ministers authorised Dean’s extradition to Taiwan. 
Dean appealed against the judicial decision and the extradition decision made by the 
Scottish Ministers.8 The appeal was heard by the Appeal Court of the Scottish High 
Court of Justiciary and its judgment was delivered on 24 June 2015.  
The international legal rights and obligations concerning extradition have 
evolved through the use of treaties, extradition being unknown to customary 
international law.9 The orthodox position is that, in the absence of a valid treaty, a 
State is not under a legal obligation to extradite an individual in response to an 
extradition request.10 However, § 194 of the UK’s Extradition Act 2003 provides for 
situations where no extradition treaty has been concluded between the requesting 
State and the requested State. In such cases, it allows for the making of ad hoc 
                                                 
6 §70(1) of the Extradition Act provides: ‘The Secretary of State must issue a certificate under this 
section if he receives a valid request for the extradition to a category 2 territory of a person who is in 
the United Kingdom’.  
7 The ROC’s Director-General provided further assurances regarding the extradition request, in a letter 
dated 25 July 2014, in which he undertook that Dean would not be prosecuted for any offences that 
were not included in the original extradition request, without the prior consent of the Home Secretary. 
Such undertakings were given in order to satisfy the ‘speciality principle’. See Arthur Watts and Robert 
Jennings (eds) Oppenheim’s International Law, Vol. 1, 961 (9th ed. OUP 1992). This principle is 
entrench in §129 of the 2003 Act. 
8 The appeal against the District Court’s decision arose from §103 of the 2003 Act while the appeal 
against the Scottish Ministers’ decision was based on §108 of the Act.  
9 See Malcolm Shaw, International Law 498 (7th ed. CUP 2014). 
10 Anthony Aust, Handbook of International Law 246 (2nd ed. CUP 2010). 
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arrangements for the purpose of extraditing a particular individual to a “territory”. 
Specifically, § 194 applies: 
  
(1) […] if the Secretary of State believes that – 
(a) arrangements have been made between the United Kingdom and 
another territory for the extradition of a person to the territory, and 
(b) the territory is not a category 1 territory or a category 2 territory. 
(2) The Secretary of State may certify that the conditions in paragraphs (a) and 
(b) of subsection (1) are satisfied in relation to the extradition of the person. 
(3) If the Secretary of State issues a certificate under subsection (2) this Act 
applies in respect of the person’s extradition to the territory as if the territory 
were a category 2 territory. 
… 
(5) A certificate under subsection (2) in relation to a person is conclusive 
evidence that the conditions in paragraphs (a) and (b) of subsection (1) are 
satisfied in relation to the person’s extradition. 
 
2.2. Was Taiwan a “Territory” for the Purposes of the 2003 Extradition Act? 
The ROC has not been recognised as a de jure State by any State.11 Today Taiwan 
is considered to be part of the People’s Republic of China (‘PRC”) by nearly all States 
and International Organisations.12 In the aftermath of the Chinese civil war, the ROC 
was still widely regarded as being the legitimate government of the State of China.13 
                                                 
11 See James Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law 125 (8th ed. 2012). 
12 The ROC is currently recognised as the de jure government of the State of China by 21 States (and 
the Holy See). The ROC operates informal representative offices, which perform a function similar to 
embassies, in many States.  
13 See the 1950 Memorandum to the Secretary-General regarding the Question of the Chinese 
Representation at the United Nations, UN Doc S/1466, 8 March 1950; Yuen-li Liang, Recognition by 
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But, over time, individual States withdrew their recognition of the ROC in favour of the 
PRC government.14 Notwithstanding the unique dynamics of the cross-Taiwan Strait 
dispute,15 the ROC has maintained a credible level of autonomy. It has been 
characterised as a political entity under the authority of a de facto government, which 
effectively controls its territory, population and discharges the usual functions of 
government, including the capacity to conduct international relations.16 As a result, the 
ROC in Taiwan is often viewed as a sui generis territorialized political entity and this 
has fuelled doubts about the extent to which it enjoys a distinct personality as a matter 
of international law.17  
The ongoing uncertainty regarding Taiwan’s international legal status quickly 
became one of the principal issues in Dean v. Lord Advocate. Specifically, the 
                                                 
the United Nations of the Representation of a Member State: Criteria and Procedure 45 AM J INT’L L, 
689 (1951); Myres McDougal and Richard Goodman, Chinese Participation in the United Nations 60 
AM J INT’L L 671 (1966); and F B Schick, The Question of China at the United Nations 12 INT’L & 
COMP. L.Q. 1235 (1963). 
14 In 1971, the UN General Assembly resolved to seat the PRC government as the sole representative 
of the China. See General Assembly Resolution 2758(XXVI)(1971). 11 I.L.M. 561 (1972). Significantly, 
in 1979, the United States, formally recognised the PRC to be the sole de jure government of China 
and that Taiwan is part of China. The US-PRC Joint Communiqué provided: “The United States of 
America recognizes the Government of the People’s Republic of China as the sole legal government of 
China […] The Government of the United States of America acknowledges the Chinese position that 
there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China.” Joint Communiqué of the United States and the 
PRC government, 73 AM J INT’L L 277 (1979). 
15 In 1991, the ROC retracted its territorial claim to the Chinese Mainland and it began to promote an 
ambiguous construction of “One China”, by which it proclaimed the goal of reunification to be a long 
term aspiration. See the ROC’s White Paper on “Relations Across the Taiwan Straits” (1994). See 
http://www.mac.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=68295&CtNode=5836&mp=4 (last visited Jan. 16, 2017). See the 
PRC’s White Paper, “The Taiwan Question and the Reunification of China”, The Taiwan Affairs Office 
(1993): http://china.org.cn/e-white/taiwan/index.htm (last visited Jan. 16 2017); and the PRC’s Second 
White Paper (2000): “The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue”: 
www.china.org.cn/english/taiwan/7956.htm (last visited Jan 16 2017). 
16 Hungdah Chiu, International Legal Status of the ROC 5 Contemporary Asian Studies Series 1 10 
(1992). See Jean-Marie Henckaerts (ed), The International Legal Status of Taiwan in the New World 
Order: Legal and Political Considerations (Kluwer Law International, 1996); Jonathan I Charney, & J R 
V Prescott, Resolving Cross-Strait Relations between China and Taiwan 94 453 AM J INT’L L (2000) . 
See Stephen Allen, Statehood, Self-determination and the ‘Taiwan Question 9 Asian Yearbook of 
International Law 191 (2000); Andrew Serdy, Bringing Taiwan into the International Fisheries Fold: The 
Legal Personality of a Fishing Entity 75 183 British Yearbook of International Law (2006); and Stefan 
Talmon, The Recognition of the Chinese Government and the Convention on International Civil Aviation 
8 Chinese Journal of International Law 135 (2009). 
17 See James Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law (2nd ed. OUP 2006), 198-221; 
James Crawford, Chance, Order, Change: The Course of International Law (The Hague Academy 
2014), 198; and Brad R Roth, Governmental Illegitimacy in International Law (OUP 1999), 263.  
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Appellant contended that the Edinburgh District Court had made errors of law and fact 
in holding that Taiwan constitutes a “territory” in connection with the application of § 
194 of the 2003 Act. Dean argued that the Secretary of State did not have the power 
to make special arrangements for his extradition there (2015, 14). In addition, the 
Appellant argued that, in reaching such a decision, the District Court was wrong 
because the basis for the Sheriff’s conclusion that Taiwan was a territory did not fall 
within the bounds of judicial knowledge. To this end, the Appellant referred to a range 
of facts which, he submitted, showed that Taiwan should not be treated as a territory 
for the present purpose – including the protracted dispute between the PRC and the 
ROC; the fact that Taiwan was not a member of the United Nations and that the UK 
government did not recognise the ROC as a State (2015, 15). The Appeal Court noted 
that this argument had previously been rejected by the District Court. The Sheriff had 
observed that the term “territory” was defined nowhere in the 2003 Act. He had taken 
the view that this lack of definition was deliberate so as to ensure the scope of the Act 
was not curtailed by the matters of pure nomenclature (2015, 14). Further, he decided 
that the term could be said to encompass nations, political entities and States as long 
as they conformed to: “a recognisable legal jurisdiction in a viable and settled area of 
populated land with a level of judicial authority stable and organised enough to be 
recognised and accepted by the United Kingdom” (2015, 14). On the facts, the Sheriff 
concluded that Taiwan could satisfy the test for a “territory”.  
The Appeal Court agreed that Taiwan constituted a “territory” for the purposes 
of the 2003 Act and that, in accordance with §194(5), the Secretary of State’s 
certification that Taiwan was a territory for this purpose was conclusive of such a status 




“The critical question is whether Taiwan is a “territory” for the purposes of the 
Act […] The essential features of a “territory” are in our opinion threefold: there 
must be an area of land; that land must contain some population; and the land 
and population must be subject to effective government, including a functioning 
legal system” (2015, 17). 
 
Moreover, the Appeal Court decided that the Sheriff was entitled to make the findings 
of fact, which underpinned his decision, as they fell within the scope of judicial 
knowledge (2015, 18).18 Lady Paton stated that the Sheriff’s findings of fact could be 
supported by a “cursory examination” of relevant sources. In response to the 
Appellant’s arguments about the effects of the dispute between the PRC and ROC 
and the controversial status of Taiwan within the international community, she 
observed that:  
 
“Many countries around the world have disputes with neighbours over the 
precise location of their boundaries, and the existence of such dispute could 
not possibly have the result that a country could not be considered a “territory”. 
The sheriff further held that Taiwan has good international relationships, a 
flourishing export market and an internationally accepted democracy. None of 
these, however, is essential for the existence of a territory; apart from land and 
population, effective government is all that is required. Finally, the sheriff held 
that there were historic and long‑standing political difficulties with the People’s 
Republic of China, which had taken the seat in the United Nations previously 
                                                 
18 In McTear v. Imperial Tobacco Ltd, [2005] 2 SC 1, Lord Nimmo Smith defined judicial knowledge as: 
“The judge will take notice of the matters… which can be immediately ascertained from sources of 
indisputable accuracy, which are so notorious as to be indisputable…”; quoted in Dean v Lord Advocate 
(2015 judgment), supra note 1, [17]. 
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occupied by Taiwan. […] Indeed, matters go further: the People’s Republic of 
China denies the right of Taiwan to exist as an independent state. Nevertheless 
these factors are, in our opinion, irrelevant to the question of whether it is a 
“territory” for the purposes of the 2003 Act; while effective government is 
essential, it does not matter whether that government is recognised by others, 
or even whether its right to govern is denied by others […]” (2015, 19). 
 
In Dean v. Lord Advocate, the courts were not required to address, directly, the 
question of Taiwan’s international legal status but it is interesting to note how the test 
for qualifying as a “territory”, devised by the District Court and the Appeal Court for the 
purposes of the application of the Extradition Act 2003, closely resembled the classical 
test for statehood in international law. At this point it is important to recall that 
statehood is a claim of right and the fact that the ROC does not maintain such a claim 
should be viewed as being determinative of its international legal status.19 
Nevertheless, as numerous municipal law cases show, this state of affairs does not 
prevent the ROC from having legal personality for certain purposes.20  
The starting point for determining whether a putative entity qualifies as a State 
for the purposes of international law is generally considered to be the criteria 
enumerated in the 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States: 
Article 1 provides that the State as a person of international law should possess the 
following criteria: (a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; 
                                                 
19 See Daniel P O’Connell, The Status of Formosa and the Chinese Recognition Problem 50 AM J INT’L 
L 405, 415 (1956); and Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law, supra note 17, 211. But 
see Chiu, supra note 16, 11-14. For a more radical perspective see Lung Chu Chen, The US-Taiwan-
China Relationship in International Law and Policy (OUP 2016). 
20 See below. 
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and (d) the capacity to enter into relations with other states.21 However, Talmon claims 
that classical international law offered a narrower test for statehood, namely, that, “a 
State exists if a population, on a certain territory, is organised under an effective public 
authority”.22 To this end, he argues that the criterion regarding the capacity to enter 
into international relations is superfluous because non-recognised States are denied 
the opportunities that flow from the establishment of optimal relations with third States 
precisely because they are not recognised rather than due to a lack of capacity per 
se.23 Further, Talmon suggests that States accept that a non-recognised State (or 
government) may exercise factual control over its territory; consequently, the 
municipal courts of third States are prepared to accept that non-recognised States and 
governments possess legal personality, for certain purposes, in the context of 
municipal litigation because such regimes do, in fact, carry out executive, legislative 
and adjudicative functions, within their own municipal legal systems.24 In other words, 
the courts of third States accept that de facto governments, or entities, exercise 
jurisdiction within the territory they control for systemic purposes.25  
Against this background, the test for a “territory” developed by the Sheriff, in the 
District Court in Dean v. Lord Advocate, clearly reflects the essential requirements for 
statehood. The Sheriff emphasized the need for a “viable and settled area of populated 
land” with an organised and stable public (judicial) authority that constitutes a 
recognisable legal jurisdiction. Moreover, he expressly referred to the need for such a 
“territory” to be, in fact, eligible for recognition by the UK government notwithstanding 
                                                 
21 The Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States 28 AM J INT’L L Supp. 75 (1933), 
(1934). These elements have since acquired the status of general customary international law. 
22 See Stefan Talmon, The Constitutive Versus the Declaratory Theory of Recognition: Tertium Non 
Datur? 75 British Yearbook of International Law 101, 110 (2005). 
23 Id. 116-7. 
24 Id. 147. 
25 Id. This is apparent from the way that the European Court of Human Rights treated the Turkish 
Republic of Northern Cyprus’s legal system in Loizidou v. Turkey (Merits) (1995) 20 EHRR 99 and 
Cyprus v. Turkey (2001) 35 EHRR 30. 
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the possibility that the government may choose not to recognise it. Accordingly, while 
the Sheriff did not use the language of statehood explicitly he did use the terminology 
of recognition, which may be indicative of a close relationship between the recognition 
of a territory for the purposes of the application of the 2003 Act and the acceptance of 
the existence of a de facto government or entity – and, specifically, the validity of its 
municipal legal system by a national court of a (non-recognising) State pursuant to the 
resolution of a domestic legal dispute. The Appeal Court’s approach to this issue 
virtually mirrored the test for classical statehood in international law without directly 
alluding to it. Moreover, it ruled that the UK’s recognition policy towards the entity in 
question was irrelevant to the task of determining whether it qualified as a territory for 
the purposes of the 2003 Act. It does not follow from these rulings that the UK courts 
accept that the ROC qualifies as a State simply because the applicable test for a 
territory under the UK’s domestic legislation broadly corresponds to the test for 
statehood at the level of international law. However, they do show that the UK courts 
are prepared to accept the validity of Taiwan’s municipal legal system for purposes of 
the adjudication of municipal legal disputes.  
The conclusion, reached in Dean v. Lord Advocate, that Taiwan qualifies as a 
“territory” for the purposes of the application of the UK’s Extradition Act is consistent 
with previous decisions reached by the municipal courts of (non-recognising) States 
which acknowledge that the ROC possesses sufficient legal personality for the 
resolution of municipal law disputes within the forum State, notwithstanding persisting 
doubts concerning its international legal status. For instance, in the US Attorney-
General v Cheng Fu Sheng et al (1960),26 a case decided prior to the US government’s 
decision to withdraw its recognition of the ROC government, the Court of Appeal of 
                                                 
26 Court of Appeal, District of Columbia, 6 October 1959, 31 I.L.R. 349. 
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the District of Columbia held that: “Since Formosa [Taiwan] was a geographical, social, 
and political entity, subject to the undisputed control of a Government, it was a 
“country” within the meaning and for the purposes of the [the US Immigration and 
Nationality Act 1952]”.27 Further, it observed that while the term “country” was not 
defined in the Act it had to be given its ordinary meaning in a manner that was 
consistent with the purposes of the legislation. In Reel v Holder (1982), the English 
Court of Appeal had to decide whether the International Amateur Athletics Federation 
had the authority to expel Taiwan’s athletics federation from the Organisation.28 It held 
that: “The term “country” referred to a territory within which a particular association 
controlled athletics. It was not synonymous with the term “State”. A colony or non-self-
governing territory was a ‘country’ for these purposes and so was Taiwan”.29  
More recently, in Civil Aeronautics Administration v Singapore Airlines Ltd, the 
Singapore Court of Appeal concluded that Taiwan could not qualify as a State for the 
purpose of pleading a defence of State immunity in response to a civil claim against 
the ROC’s civil aviation authority.30 Despite the existence of extensive dealings and 
close co-operation between the governments of Singapore and Taiwan and the 
conclusion of numerous agreements and MOUs, the Appeal Court concluded that the 
government of Singapore had consistently adhered to the notion of “One China”. 
Moreover, it observed that the evidence indicated that Singapore has always evinced 
an intention not to recognise Taiwan as a State.31 The Appeal Court concluded that 
Taiwan was not a State for the purpose of a claim of State immunity in the Singapore 
                                                 
27 Id. 350.  
28 Reel v Holder (1981) 74 I.L.R. 105. 
29 Id. 106. 
30 (2004) 133 I.L.R. 371. 
31 Id. [35-36]. 
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courts b.ecause it was not recognised as a de jure (or de facto) State by Singapore.32 
Nonetheless, the Court acknowledged that the ROC possessed legal personality for 
the purpose of defending civil claims in Singapore’s courts. To this end, the Court 
noted that: “… once it is appreciated that the non-recognition of Taiwan is only in 
respect of the Act there is no reason why its effect should or need be extended to other 
respects. That would be completely unwarranted. The existence of Taiwan is a fact 
and the government of Taiwan exercises control over a specified area”.33  
The issue considered by the Appeal Court in Dean v Lord Advocate was 
whether Taiwan qualified as a “territory” for the purposes of the application of UK law 
rather than the question of whether Taiwan is a State as a matter of international law. 
Nevertheless, it is submitted that such an enquiry required the Court to undertake 
some kind of assessment of Taiwan’s (international) legal personality for the purpose 
of establishing that it qualified as a territory in any event. At a general level, beyond 
the colonial context, modern international law is unfamiliar with the concept of a 
“territory”.34 Accordingly, in order to devise a working conception of a territorialized 
political entity – whether consciously or otherwise – the obvious reference point is the 
well-established notion of statehood. Consequently, while the Appeal Court did not 
allude, directly, to the test of statehood at any point in its 2015 judgment, it is 
                                                 
32 The Singapore Court of Appeal decided that the Singapore government’s refusal to say that Taiwan 
was a State meant that the absence of an Executive Certificate confirming that the government 
recognised Taiwan as a State it could not qualify as a State for the purposes of the Singapore State 
Immunity Act. To this end, it ruled that the courts and the government had to speak with one voice on 
such matters. See id. [27 and 41]. In contrast, in Parent v. Singapore Airlines Ltd., (22 October 2003), 
a case instituted in the Canadian courts arising out of the same incident, the Superior Court of Quebec 
took a broader view. It decided that the approach of the Canadian government, which was materially 
the same as the one adopted by the government of Singapore on this issue, required the Quebec Court 
to investigate for itself whether Taiwan was indeed a State by reference to the evidence available to it. 
The case of Parent v. Singapore Airlines Ltd., is addressed in Civil Aeronautics Administration v. 
Singapore Airlines Ltd, id. [37-41].   
33 Id. [50].  
34 The notions of “Non-Self-Governing Territories” and “Trust Territories” were developed in Articles 73 
and 76 of the UN Charter, respectively, with a view to promoting decolonisation.       
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suggested that the question of Taiwan’s international personality suffused its 
reasoning throughout and its findings on this matter are important because they bolster 
the view adopted in previous decisions that the ROC does possess a degree of 
international legal personality despite its widespread lack of international recognition. 
Moreover, as extradition arrangements presuppose the existence of relations of 
mutual trust between governments (or autonomous political regimes). To this end, if 
the UK government viewed Taiwan as an international outcast that lacked any 
measure of legal personality then it would not have considered the prospect of entering 
into an extradition arrangement with the government of such a political entity. Clearly 
any finding that Taiwan qualifies as a “country” or a “territory” by a municipal court for 
the purposes of the application of national law does not mean that Taiwan should be 
recognised as a State, as a result.35 However, it does show that the municipal courts 
of (non-recognising) third States are prepared to accept that Taiwan possesses legal 
personality for certain public law purposes despite their Executive’s refusal to 
recognise the ROC as a State or government.           
 
2.3. Dean’s Claims under the ECHR 
§87(1) of the Extradition Act provides that, if an extradition request relates to an 
individual who has been convicted in the requesting State, a UK court must decide 
whether the extradition would be compatible with his or her rights under the European 
Convention on Human Rights, pursuant to the application of the Human Rights Act 
1998. If it decides that extradition would be incompatible with such rights then it is 
required to order his or her discharge, under §87(2) of the 2003 Act.  
                                                 
35 Crawford has suggested that Taiwan has acquired that status of a “proto-State”. See James 
Crawford, Chance, Order, Change: The Course of International Law, supra note 17, 361.  
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Dean claimed that his Convention right to a fair trial, under Article 6, was 
engaged by the decision to extradite him to Taiwan.36 Specifically, he claimed that 
media bias had provoked judicial bias against him.37 Dean also made allegations that 
judicial corruption was rife within the ROC’s legal system and that it had affected his 
own case too.38 In Soering v. UK, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that: “an 
issue might exceptionally be raised under Article 6 by an extradition decision where 
the fugitive has suffered or risks suffering a flagrant denial of a fair trial in the 
requesting country”.39 Further, giving the leading Opinion in the House of Lords 
decision in R (Ullah) v. Special Adjudicator, Lord Bingham observed that a “very strong 
case” would need to be made out in order to rely upon Article 6.40 In the circumstances, 
in the District Court in Dean v. Lord Advocate, the Sheriff concluded that:  
 
                                                 
36 Article 6(1) of the ECHR provides: “In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any 
criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by 
an independent and impartial tribunal established by law […]” 
37 Dean complained that the media in Taiwan had portrayed him as a remorseless rich foreigner who 
had been treated leniently by Taiwan’s criminal justice system. He claimed that the media coverage 
was xenophobic and, in particular, that media hostility stemmed from his Indian ethnicity. 2015 
judgment, supra note 1, [30-31]. The Appellant did not claim that the judges involved in deciding his 
case were biased against him, as such. Instead he argued that they were afraid to enter a true verdict 
in his case as a consequence of the public resentment towards him, [26].    
38 Mr Chen, the lawyer who represented Dean at his trial in Taiwan, gave evidence during the extradition 
proceedings at the Edinburgh District Court. He claimed that judicial corruption was rife in Taiwan. 
However, the Sheriff observed that Chen could not provide evidence of specific examples of such 
alleged corruption and he admitted that he had no personal experience of it. Accordingly, the Sheriff 
concluded that Chen amounted to an unreliable witness on this point. Id. [35]. The Sheriff reached the 
conclusion that:   
“[Mr Dean] has been given some information since his own difficulties in this matter have arisen 
[…], and he has chosen to believe it and to conclude that it may, by some remote possibility, 
apply to his case. I am clear that I cannot find that such information as he has applies to this 
trial, and I have to find that he is grasping at straws in that connection and is doing a disservice 
to the Taiwanese justice system in putting forward an entirely unsubstantiated allegation about 
one or more or all of the judges in his case being corruptly influenced […] [36].”  
39 (1989) 11 EHRR 439, [113]. 
40 [2004] 2 AC 323, [24]. Further, in Othman v. UK, (2012) 55 EHRR 1, the Strasbourg Court held that 
threshold for a finding of a violation of Article 6 ECHR was extremely high. What was needed was a 
breach of the principles, which underpin the right to a fair trial that had the effect of destroying the very 
essence of the right guaranteed by Article 6, [260].  
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“The simple fact is that all of the evidence that I have heard at this hearing 
indicates that Mr Dean had a very full and fair trial process […] I have heard 
nothing in this hearing that suggests that there was any level of unfairness at 
all in relation to the provision of evidence in Taiwan far less a level of information 
which would suggest a blatant denial of his rights under article 6 of ECHR’ 
(2015, 34).  
 
The Appeal Court decided to uphold the Sheriff’s findings. Consequently, it dismissed 
Dean’s claim that he had not received a fair trial because the Appellant could not 
adduce evidence that his trial had amounted to a flagrant instance of injustice (2015, 
48).  
Dean’s other main claim was that prison conditions in Taiwan were such that, 
if he were returned there, he would be exposed to inhuman or degrading treatment, 
contrary to the terms of Article 3 of the ECHR.41 The applicable test, developed in 
Soering v. UK, provides that a Contracting State will incur responsibility under the 
Convention, where: “substantial grounds have been shown for believing that the 
person concerned, if extradited, faces a real risk of being subject to torture or to 
inhuman or degrading treatment”.42 Consequently, the Appeal Court had to decide 
whether Dean was at risk of being ill-treated, if he were to be extradited to Taiwan.43 
Notwithstanding the Sheriff’s ruling that Dean’s extradition would not lead to a breach 
of this provision, the Appeal Court chose to adjourn the proceedings in order to hear 
                                                 
41 Article 3 of the ECHR provides that: “No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment”. 
42 Soering, supra note 39, [91]. 
43 See Ahmed v. Austria (1997) 24 EHRR 278. See Ivor Stanbrook and Clive Stanbrook, Extradition 
Law and Practice (2nd ed. OUP 2000), 103-105. 
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further argument about this issue, with a view to determining the ultimate fate of the 
appeal (2015, 73-75).  
 
3. The 2016 Appeal Court Judgment  
In its second judgment,44 the Appeal Court held, by a majority verdict, that the 
Appellant’s extradition would violate the terms of Article 3 of the ECHR. Specifically, 
the majority concluded that the available evidence supported the existence of 
substantial grounds for believing that there would be a real risk of suffering ill-
treatment, if Dean were to be detained in Taipei prison. Further, the majority ruled that 
the diplomatic assurances, given by the ROC government in the 2013 MOU (and 
subsequently) were not sufficient to remove the established risk. As a result, under the 
provisions of § 87 of the Extradition Act 2003, the Court ordered Dean’s discharge.  
 
3.1. The Principle of Non-Refoulement and Article 3 ECHR 
Article 3 of the ECHR does not refer explicitly to the non-refoulement principle.45 In 
sharp contrast, Article 3(1) of the UN Convention Against Torture provides that: “No 
State Party shall expel, return (“refouler”) or extradite a person to another State where 
there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being 
subjected to torture”.46 However, in Soering v UK, the Strasbourg Court indicated that 
the absence of an express endorsement of this cardinal principle in Article 3 of the 
ECHR was not problematic.47 The Court held that it would be incompatible with the 
                                                 
44 This hearing was held on 27-29 January, 18-19 May and 22 and 24 June 2016. Judgment was 
delivered on 23 September 2016.  
45 See Jacobs, White and Ovey, The European Convention on Human Rights (5th ed. OUP 2010), 167-
194. 
46 The UN Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (1984) 1465 UNTS 85. See Manfred Nowak and Elizabeth McArthur, The United Nations 
Convention Against Torture (OUP 2008), 126-228. 
47 Soering, supra note 39, [88]. 
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values underpinning the European Convention if a Contracting State were able to 
surrender a fugitive, knowingly, to a third State where there were substantial grounds 
for believing that s/he would be in danger of being ill-treated in the event of his or her 
extradition.48 Accordingly, it ruled that the non-refoulement principle could be implied 
into the terms of Article 3 of the ECHR. Moreover, as noted above, in Soering, the 
European Court established the applicable test in such situations, namely, that a 
Contracting State will incur responsibility under Article 3, where: “substantial grounds 
have been shown for believing that the person concerned, if extradited, faces a real 
risk of being subject to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment”.49  
This test has been reiterated by the Strasbourg Court on numerous occasions 
since that time. In Saadi v. Italy, the Court stated that, in order to qualify as a real risk 
of ill-treatment, there must be more than a chance that the proscribed treatment will 
occur.50 It has been observed that this test will be satisfied by a risk that amounted to 
something less than the balance of probabilities.51 Nevertheless, it has been 
repeatedly stated that the requirement to engage in prospective assessments about 
what might happen in the event of a given individual being removed, returned, expelled 
or extradited does not affect the burden of proof in such cases, it remains with the 
Applicant.52 Moreover, while the prohibition on torture, inhuman and degrading 
treatment is absolute what qualifies as ill-treatment depends on the circumstances of 
a given case. Specifically, it has been shown that the terms of Article 3 will only be 
satisfied if a minimum level of severity of harm is established.53 In situations where a 
request has been made for the extradition of an individual from the jurisdiction of a 
                                                 
48 Id. 
49 Id. [91]. 
50 [2009] 49 EHHR 30, [128]. 
51 Aldhouse v. Thailand [2012] EWHC 2235, [26]. 
52 Deya v. Kenya [2008] EWHC 2914 (Admin) [36-37]. 
53 Elashmawy v. Court of Brescia, Italy [2015] EWHC 28 Admin, [49].  
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Contracting State, and the receiving State is not a party to the ECHR, the courts of the 
requested State must conduct a rigorous assessment of the circumstances of the case 
under consideration.54 However, the Strasbourg Court has stated that, in order to grant 
extradition in such a case, a Contracting State is not under an obligation to impose 
Convention standards on a receiving State that is not a party to the ECHR.55  
The existence of a gap between Contracting States and third States, as far as 
human rights protections are concerned, may be bridged by the use of diplomatic 
assurances in appropriate cases. However, the weight attached to undertakings, given 
by the receiving State, regarding the treatment of the person concerned in the event 
of his/her extradition, will depend on the quality of the assurances in question and the 
wider practices of the receiving State in connection with such matters.56 The practice 
of using diplomatic assurances has evolved to guard against violations of an 
individual’s Convention rights in cases where the government of a Contracting State 
wants to extradite him or her to another State, notwithstanding evidence showing that 
his or her Convention rights are in danger of being violated, in the event of extradition. 
This practice has been justified as a pragmatic means of ensuring national security, 
preventing terrorism and facilitating justice. However, it has been strongly criticised on 
numerous grounds, including that such undertakings amount to unreliable or 
unenforceable promises that do not uphold the Convention rights of the affected 
individuals in reality.57 Despite these major criticisms, in Othman v UK, the Strasbourg 
Court, stated that its task was not to rule on the propriety, or wider significance, of the 
use of diplomatic assurances instead it was concerned with whether they had a 
                                                 
54 Chahal v. UK (1997) 23 EHRR 413, 96; and Saadi, supra, note 50, [128-9]. 
55 Ahmad v. UK (2013) 56 EHRR 1, [177]. 
56 Othman (supra, note 40), [189]. 
57 Id. at 43-46. Also see Agiza v. Sweden (Comm. No. 233/2003), 20 May 2005 (UNCAT Committee); 
and Alzery v. Sweden (CPR/C/88/D/1416/2005), 10 November 2006 (Human Rights Committee).   
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practical effect in particular cases.58 In order to determine the risk posed to the 
individual concerned the Court must, first, have regard to the general human rights 
situation in the receiving State before considering his or her particular circumstances. 
Ultimately, a court must satisfy itself that the diplomatic assurances provided by the 
receiving State are capable of alleviating an established risk of ill-treatment.59  
In Othman, the European Court devised an extensive list of factors to assist 
national courts in assessing the reliability of specific undertakings in concrete cases.60 
Given their importance to the present case, it is worth setting out the eleven Othman 
criteria in full:  
 
1. Whether the terms of the diplomatic assurances have been disclosed to the 
Court;  
2. Whether the diplomatic assurances are specific or general and vague; 
3. The authority of the representative who has given the diplomatic assurances 
and whether they are capable of binding the receiving State; 
4. If the diplomatic assurances have been made by the central government, 
whether the local authorities involved can be expected to observed them;  
5. Whether the diplomatic assurances have been given in respect of treatment 
that is lawful and unlawful in the receiving State; 
6. Whether the diplomatic assurances have been provided by a contracting state; 
7. The length and the strength of the bilateral relation between the governments 
involved and the receiving State’s record of abiding by similar assurances; 
                                                 
58 Othman, id. [186-7]. 
59 Chahal, supra note 54, [105], Saadi, supra note 50,, [148], and Othman, id. [187]. 
60 Othman, id. [189]. 
22 
 
8. Whether the receiving State’s compliance with the diplomatic assurances can 
be monitored by diplomatic and/or other means; 
9. Whether there is an effective system protecting against instances of ill 
treatments in the receiving State; 
10. Whether the Applicant has previously been ill-treated in the receiving State; and 
11. Whether the reliability of the diplomatic assurances in question has been 
examined by a municipal court of the sending Contracting State.61  
 
In Othman, the Court observed that rarely will no weight at all be attributed to 
diplomatic undertakings given by a requesting State.62 It noted that as long as the 
assurances given are comprehensive, specific and cogent; the relations between the 
requested and requesting States are strong enough to give rise to mutual trust and 
confidence; the requesting State has a good record of honouring similar commitments 
in the past; and the reliability of the assurances has been rigorously assessed then it 
is open for a court to accept the diplomatic assurances in issue as amounting to a 
practical guarantee that the individual concerned will be protected against ill-
treatment.63 The conclusion may be reached even if powerful evidence exists to show 
that torture or ill-treatment is “widespread and routine” in the requesting State.64 
The European Court has conceded that instances where the non-refoulement 
principle is engaged are often different from other kinds of ill-treatment cases because 
                                                 
61 Id.  [189].  
62 Id. [188]. 
63 Id. [189]. 
64 Id. [143-146] and [272]. It is worth reiterating that such a conclusion depends on a rigorous 
assessment the reliability of the diplomatic assurances in issue. For instance, in Chahal v. UK, the 
Strasbourg Court decided that the diplomatic assurances given by the Indian government were 
unreliable despite being given in good faith and the existence of relations of mutual trust and confidence 
between the two governments involved. It reached this conclusion due to evidence of the recalcitrant 
conduct of the regional security forces, which meant that the undertakings did not amount to a sufficient 
guarantee of individual’s safety in the event of his return to the Punjab. See Chahal, supra note 54, 
[105].       
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decision-makers are required to make assessments about the likelihood or 
foreseeability of harm.65 Consequently, fine-grained determinations may be made 
about whether a given individual should be extradited or not, leading to decisions 
about which different judges may disagree.66 As far as the extra-territorial dimension 
of Article 3 ECHR, occasioned via the application of the non-refoulement principle, is 
concerned, in Ahmad v UK, the Strasbourg Court noted that: “treatment which might 
violate Article 3 because of an act or omission by a Contracting State might not attain 
the minimum level of severity which is required for there to be a violation of Article 3 
in an expulsion or extradition case”.67 In Ahmad, the Court made it clear that it is not 
for Contracting States to impose Convention standards on third States.68 Moreover, it 
noted that, in its jurisprudence, “it has been very cautious in finding that removal from 
the territory of a Contracting State would be contrary to Article 3’ especially where the 
receiving State has, “a long history of respect of democracy, human rights, and the 
rule of law”.69 However, the extent to which Convention standards should be followed 
in non-Contracting States was precisely the issue that fell to be decided in Dean v. 
Lord Advocate. 
 
3.2. The Majority and Dissenting Opinions  
In her Opinion, Lady Paton observed that the ROC authorities had originally intended 
that, upon return, Dean would serve his sentence in Taipei prison under the conditions 
afforded to the general prison population (2016, 48). However, she noted that 
concerns about the conditions of his detention, which came to light during the 
                                                 
65 Ahmad, supra note 55, [178]. 
66 Id. 178 and see R (Wellington) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] UKHL 72. 
67 Ahmad, id. [177]. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. [179]. 
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proceedings, meant that they were no longer planning to follow such a course of 
action. She said, step by step, they had sought to devise special arrangements for him 
in an effort to comply with the requirements of Article 3 (2016, 48). The First 
Respondent’s expert witness, Dr McManus, was engaged to investigate the prison 
conditions in which the Appellant would be detained ((2016, 30 & 34). Nevertheless, 
from his impression of the general conditions in Taipei prison and the available data, 
Dr McManus took the view that the prison was grossly overcrowded and significantly 
understaffed at material time. Specifically, he noted that the prison regime failed to 
meet a number of relevant CPT Standards.70 Consequently, he was not prepared to 
say that, if the Appellant were to be subjected to general prison conditions, his 
treatment would comply with the terms of Article 3 (2016, 35).  
According to Lady Paton, the key question was whether this exceptional 
regime, underpinned by a series of diplomatic assurances, was sufficient to remove 
the risk of ill-treatment in the event of Dean’s extradition to Taiwan (2016, 45). She 
was troubled by the evidence of the general conditions affecting Taipei prison during 
the period in question, noting that overcrowding had reached 41% by the time of Dr 
McManus’s visit in August 2015 (2016, 51).71 Lady Paton quoted from the CPT 
Standards regarding the consequences of gross overcrowding in prisons. They stated 
that: 
 
                                                 
70 Dean v Lord Advocate, 2016 judgment, supra note 1, [32-33].The Council of Europe Committee for 
the Prevention of Torture is the monitoring body for the European Convention on the Prevention of 
Torture (1987) ETS No. 126. It is responsible for developing standards designed to prevent instances 
of ill-treatment. CPT Standards (CPT/Inf/E (2002) 1-Rev. 2015): http://www.cpt.coe.int/en/about.htm 
(last visited Jan.16, 2017). The UK ratified the European Convention on the Prevention of Torture in 
1988. 
71 Lady Paton referred to the statistical evidence which showed that each prison inmate had only 1.5 
square metres of cell space, which was below the 2.31 square metres minimum specific by the ROC’s 




“An overcrowded prison entails cramped and unhygienic accommodation; a 
constant lack of privacy (even when performing such basic tasks as using a 
sanitary facility); reduced out‑of‑cell activities, due to demand outstripping the 
staff and facilities available; overburdened health‑care services; increased 
tension and hence more violence between prisoners and between prisoners 
and staff. This list is far from exhaustive. The CPT has been led to conclude on 
more than one occasion that the adverse effects of overcrowding have resulted 
in inhuman and degrading conditions of detention…”72  
 
Accordingly, she decided that it was highly doubtful that they would be able to fulfil the 
assurances, given the degree which the prison was overcrowded and under-resourced 
(2016, 52).  
Lady Paton was also disturbed by the conditions of solitary confinement that 
Dean would have to endure as a result of concerns about his safety, namely his 
vulnerability to attack by resentful prisoners. In this respect, she referred to the 
relevant CPT Standards which provided that:  
 
“[Page 20] paragraph 56 … Solitary confinement can, in certain circumstances, 
amount to inhuman and degrading treatment; [Page 29] paragraph 53… The 
CPT has always paid particular attention to prisoners undergoing solitary 
confinement, because it can have an extremely damaging effect on the mental, 
somatic and social health of those concerned; [Page 29] paragraph 54 … The 
CPT understands the term ‘solitary confinement’ as meaning whenever a 
                                                 
72 2016 judgment, [51]. CPT Standards, [13]. 
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prisoner is ordered to be held separately from other prisoners, for example … 
for the protection of the prisoner concerned. (2016, 53).” 
 
Further, Lady Paton referred to CPT Standards which recommended that prisoners 
should be offered a range of activities that were purposeful and, specifically, that 
prisoners should have the opportunity to spend at least eight hours a day out of their 
cells in order to engage in meaningful activities.73 Moreover, she thought that the 
medical services available in Taipei prison were inadequate. She noted that there were 
insufficient members of medical, paramedical and dental staff at the prison and she 
indicated that such a state of affairs was contrary to the relevant CPT Standards.74 
Finally, Lady Paton drew attention to the expert evidence which indicated that there 
was no established means by which a prisoner could challenge the conditions of his 
or her detention through the municipal courts in Taiwan (2016, 57). In her view, this 
situation was also contrary to fundamental CPT standards (2016, 54).  
In his dissenting Opinion, Lord Drummond Young accepted that the general 
conditions in Taipei prison were poor and that gross overcrowding could lead to a 
finding of ill-treatment (2016, 75). But he relied upon Dr McManus’s conclusion that, 
despite the poor conditions in Taipei prison, the undertakings provided by the ROC 
authorities would ensure that the prison regime did not meet the severity threshold 
required for a breach of Article 3 and that the proposed cell itself was Article 3 
compliant (2016, 34 & 82). Lord Drummond Young considered that the decisive factor 
was whether the diplomatic assurances, given by the ROC in the 2013 MOU, and 
subsequently, eliminated the risk of ill-treatment in the event of Dean’s extradition 
                                                 
73 CPT Standards, p.7, cited in the 2016 judgment, [53]. 
74 CPT Standards, p.39, id, [55]. 
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(2016, 75 & 81). To this end, he examined the undertakings concerning the proposed 
arrangements for Dean’s incarceration in Taipei prison. He referred to an undertaking, 
given by the ROC government on 25 February 2014, that: Dean would be housed in 
a prison cell with fewer inmates than would normally be allocated to a cell; the 
occupants of such a cell would be foreign prisoners with no record of violence; the 
prison authorities would screen prisoners who may come into contact with the 
Appellant; Dean would be separated from group activities, if necessary; and a clear 
communications procedure would be established for the purpose of making requests 
and complaints (2016, 10). Lord Drummond Young concluded that, in principle, these 
assurances were sufficient to ensure Dean’s safety (2016, 77).75  
Lord Drummond Young thought that the claim that Dean would be vulnerable 
to attack from other prisoners, as a result of the privileged detention arrangements 
that were being proposed for him and his proclaimed notoriety was exaggerated (2016, 
97-98). Nevertheless, he considered the issue of whether the practice, followed in the 
ROC’s prison system, of determining eligibility of parole by reference to work duties 
undertaken while a prison inmate in Taiwan had prejudicial effect on the Appellant 
(2016, 87). Lord Drummond Young concluded that this practice may indeed be 
disadvantageous to Dean as concerns about the possibility of him receiving 
unfavourable treatment from other prisoners may well prevent him from engaging in 
group activities, such as work.76 But while Lord Drummond Young appreciated that 
the non-availability of parole would constitute a disadvantage, in his view, it did not 
qualify as ill-treatment (2016, 87). Ultimately, he concluded that this potential outcome 
                                                 
75 To this end, he noted that, on 19 August 2015, the ROC’s Ministry of Justice gave a further 
undertaking, that the Appellant would be housed in a cell that was Article 3 compliant. 2016 judgment, 
[10] and [78]. 
76 The ROC prison authorities would only take time served in a prison in Taiwan into account for the 
purpose of calculating eligibility for parole. Therefore, the time that Dean had served in a Scottish prison 
would not count for towards any entitlement for his early release. 2016 judgment, [87]. 
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was attributable to Dean’s decision to flee the jurisdiction rather than a punishment 
that would be imposed upon him by the prison authorities (2016, 101-2). The second 
cause for concern arose from the claim that fears for Dean’s personal safety would 
result in his de facto solitary confinement (2016, 88). However, Lord Drummond Young 
adopted the view that any decision taken by the Appellant to remain in his cell resulted 
from a choice on his part (2016, 101).77 Accordingly, as far as Lord Drummond Young 
was concerned, such confinement would not amount to a violation of Article 3.78  
Lord Drummond Young applied the Othman criteria to the facts. He thought that 
the first criterion was easily satisfied as there had been full disclosure of the terms of 
the diplomatic assurances during the proceedings (2016, 92). With regard to the 
second criterion, he said that the undertakings concerning the proposed arrangements 
for Dean’s detention in Taipei prison were detailed and specific in nature (2016, 92). 
He thought that the third and fourth criteria were satisfied, as the key assurances had 
been given by the Director-General of the ROC’s Ministry of Justice, and they were 
capable of binding the ROC. Moreover, the evidence indicated that they would be 
implemented by the Taipei prison authorities (2016, 92-93). Further, Lord Drummond 
Young observed that the fifth criterion was clearly met because the assurances related 
to the way in which lawful custodial arrangements were organised in Taiwan (2016, 
93). He acknowledged that the sixth criterion could not be satisfied as Taiwan is not a 
party to the ECHR (2016, 93). He conceded that the ties between the UK and the ROC 
in Taiwan were weak due to the absence of diplomatic relations. Nonetheless, he 
alluded to the fact that the UK operates a representative office in Taipei and he 
                                                 
77 Lord Drummond Young noted that the same kind of practice may occur in a Scottish prison due to 
concerns about a prisoner’s safety under Article 2 of the ECHR (the right to life) and Article 5 (the right 
to personal security). Id. [107]. 
78 Nor did he consider that the level of accessible medical services in Taipei prison qualified as ill-
treatment. Id. [103].  
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indicated that there was no reason to suppose that the ordinary consular protections 
would be afforded to the Appellant in the event of his extradition. Moreover, he 
indicated that the ROC’s undertaking, of 25 December 2015, suggested that this 
remedial mechanism would be available in the event of a failure to implement the 
undertakings properly (2016, 93).79 Lord Drummond Young noted the Foreign Office’s 
confirmation that it conducted consular visits to UK nationals detained in prisons in 
Taiwan went some way towards satisfying the eight criterion (2016, 93). While he 
noted that the ROC had “ratified” the International Covenants on Human Rights (2016, 
90 & 93),80 he appreciated that the under-developed state of prisoner rights in Taiwan 
meant it could not be said with certainty that the ninth criterion had been met (2016, 
94). Lord Drummond Young observed that the tenth criterion was inapplicable on the 
facts and the final criterion was being satisfied through the current proceedings (2016, 
94). He concluded that a sufficient number of the Othman criteria were satisfied for the 
ROC’s diplomatic assurances to be taken into account for the purpose of deciding 
whether Dean’s extradition would violate his Convention rights under Article 3 (2016, 
95).  
Lady Paton’s reading of the Othman criteria was somewhat different. She 
concluded that criteria six to nine were not satisfied (2016, 56). In addition, to her 
concerns about the under-developed condition of prisoner rights in the jurisdiction, she 
thought the absence of international monitoring of prison conditions in Taiwan of any 
external enforcement methods, via United Nations or relevant treaty bodies, to be 
                                                 
79 The ROC government promised that if British officials in Taipei raised concerns about an alleged 
breach of assurance the ROC authorities would ensure that, if a breach had occurred, it would be 
remedied. Id. [10] and [79].  
80 Prior to its widespread de-recognition in favour of the PRC, the ROC government played a significant 
international role in the development of international human rights treaties. However, while it signed the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights, they were never ratified. The International Covenants were adopted by UN G.A. 
res. 2200A (XXI) (1966), UN Doc. A/6316 (1966); I.C.C.P.R., 999 U.N.T.S. 171, entered into force 
March 23, 1976; I.E.S.C.R, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, entered into force January 23, 1976.  
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deeply problematic (2016, 56). Further, in her view, the lack of diplomatic ties and the 
shortcomings in the general system of the diplomatic protection as a means of holding 
a receiving State to account in the event that diplomatic assurances were breached, 
and the lack of relevant expertise on the part of the British officials stationed in Taipei, 
meant that the monitoring processes proposed in Dean’s case were not fit for purpose 
(2016, 56). Relying on the authority of Florea v Romania, Lady Paton stated that 
systemic problems could provide the basis for a finding that substantial grounds exist 
in support of a belief that an individual would be exposed to a real risk of ill-treatment 
in the event extradition were capable of direct application to the present case (2016, 
58).81 These factors led Lady Paton to the conclusion that the exceptional 
arrangements proposed in this case were not sufficient to remove the real risk of ill-
treatment contrary to Article 3 (2016, 50 & 59).  
In sharp contrast, Lord Drummond Young placed considerable weight on the 
authority of Ahmad v UK and the relativist viewpoint, expressed in that decision (2016, 
73). To this end, he relied upon the case of Richards v Ghana where the High Court 
held that “very strong grounds” would be needed before a court would be prepared to 
conclude that bad prison conditions meant that the minimum severity threshold had 
been reached where the requesting State was not a party to the Convention.82 Lord 
Drummond Young concluded that the Appellant had failed to prove that Article 3 would 
be infringed if he were to be extradited to Taiwan. He expressed the view that the 
arguments against extradition were predominantly based on the standards that would 
be applicable within the jurisdiction of a State that is a party to the ECHR (2016, 76). 
Lord Drummond Young thought the diplomatic assurances, provided by the ROC 
                                                 
81 Florea v Judicial Authority, Romania [2015] 1 WLR 1953, [32]. 
82 [2013] EWHC 1254 Admin [57-58]. Dean v Lord Advocate, supra note 1, 2016 judgment, [74]. 
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government, represented a genuine attempt to satisfy the concerns raised by 
reference to those standards and that they could be relied upon to remove the risk that 
Dean would suffer ill-treatment on his return to Taiwan (2016, 107).  
On 4 November 2016, the Lord Advocate made an application to the Court of 
Appeal seeking leave to appeal its decision to the UK Supreme Court. By a majority 
verdict, leave to appeal was refused (Lord Drummond Young dissenting).83 The 
majority (Lady Paton and Lady Clark) decided that the judgment of 23 September 2016 
was a fact-based verdict and that, as the decision revealed no material errors of fact, 
an appeal to the Supreme Court was unfounded.84 Moreover, the majority ruled that 
the unique nature of the facts in Dean v. Lord Advocate meant that the case had very 
little precedential value. Accordingly, it held that an appeal to the Supreme Court would 
not justified as the case did not manifest an issue of general public importance.85 Lord 
Drummond Young strenuously disagreed with the majority’s conclusions. He 
considered that both the status and application of the Othman criteria and the extent 
to which courts could rely on the enforcement of diplomatic undertakings, by consular 
representatives, were in need of further clarification. Further, he took the view that 
these matters were liable to arise again the future in extradition cases and that they, 
therefore, satisfied the general requirement that appeals to the Supreme Court had to 
give rise to an issue of general public importance.86  
 
4. Analysing the Appeal Court’s Judgments in Dean v. Lord Advocate 
4.1. The Application of ECHR Standards to Non-Convention Countries 
                                                 
83 [2016] HCJAC 117. 
84 Id. [13]. 
85 Id. [14]. 
86 Id. [21-26]. He also thought that the issues involving the application of Article 3 of the ECHR gave 
rise to points of law rather than matters of fact, [23].   
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As noted above, in Ahmad, the Strasbourg Court made it plain that the ECHR does 
not require Contracting States to impose Convention standards on third States in 
extradition cases. Moreover, in that case, it observed that what would constitute a 
violation of Article 3, if it were to occur within the jurisdiction of a Contracting State, 
would not necessarily qualify as a breach in an extra-territorial setting.87 The Court 
went on to identify instances where individuals had been ill-treatment while being 
subject to prison conditions. This list included situations where the responsible 
authorities had deliberately set out to debase or humiliate the individual in question; 
where measures were imposed that had the effect of causing fear and anguish; and 
where the individual concerned had suffered intense distress or hardship beyond the 
unavoidable level of suffering occasioned by detention.88 As previously mentioned, the 
Court added that it had been very cautious in finding that extradition to a non-
Convention State would breach the terms of Article 3.89 
 It is clear that the list of factors provided by the European Court was not 
intended to be exhaustive and while the cases cited all concerned instances of ill-
treatment when the Applicants were held in custody they were not necessarily cases 
involving the application of the non-refoulement principle. However, it is possible to 
interpret the enumerated cases as providing generic guidance as to the level of 
severity of harm that would be required to justify a finding that the terms of Article 3 
had been breached in a concrete “extra-territorial” case. To this end, it is notable that 
the Court referred to the examples given as “factors”.90 In Richards v. Ghana, the 
English High Court measured the factual components of that case against the relevant 
                                                 
87 Ahmad, supra note 55, [177]. Also see Aleksanyan v. Russia (2011) 52 EHRR 18. 
88 Ahmad, id. [178]. 
89 Id. [179]. 
90 Id. [178]. 
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factors provided in Ahmad.91 It observed that the case law revealed, ‘the need for very 
strong grounds before a Court would be willing to conclude that the prison conditions 
in a non-Convention State attain the level of severity” required for a violation of Article 
3.92 In Richards, the High Court concluded that the Applicant would have had to 
endure “severe” prison conditions that fell well below Convention standards in the 
event of his extradition to Ghana and his subsequent detention (if convicted).93 
However, it held that such prison conditions did not meet the required minimum 
threshold of severity, on the facts.94  
Moreover, in Florea v Romania, an extradition case where the Applicant alleged 
that he would suffer ill-treatment as a result of his detention in a grossly overcrowded 
Romanian prison, it is worth noting that rather than discharging the Applicant, the High 
Court chose to adjourn the proceedings so that enquiries could be made to establish 
if Romania, a Contracting State to the ECHR, would be prepared to offer diplomatic 
assurances that would eliminate the evident risk of a violation of Article 3 in the instant 
case.95 In Dean v. Lord Advocate, the majority harnessed the authority of Florea in 
support of the view that general institutional problems could support the existence of 
a real risk of ill-treatment. However, the approach adopted by the High Court in that 
case was to explore whether diplomatic undertakings could remove such a risk. 
Evidently, the High Court did not think that the general prison conditions in Romanian 
                                                 
91 Richards, supra note 82, [46], [60-65]. In that case, the Applicant sought to challenge his extradition 
to face a charge of attempt murder by arguing that, if he were convicted, prison conditions would amount 
to ill-treatment, contrary to Article 3. The High Court relied on the authority of Harkins v. UK (App. No. 
9446/07) decided on 17 January 2012. The case was joined with Ahmad.  
92 Richards, id. [58]. 
93 The Chief Magistrate established that the conditions in Ankaful prison were adverse. They included 
that each cell housed 10 inmates leaving each prison little room (less than one square meter per 
individual); the cell toilet was less than one meter from the nearest beds; there was a serious problem 
with mosquitos in the prison (but no nets were provided); there was a lack of educational and 
recreational facilities available to prisoners. Id. [40-41].       
94 Id. [65]. 
95 Florea, supra note 81, [44]. 
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prisons would be a barrier to satisfying the terms of Article 3, if special arrangements 
could be made for the Applicant for the purpose of his extradition. Consequently, it 
appears that that Florea is a questionable authority for the proposition that general 
prison conditions outweigh special arrangements made for a given individual in 
extradition cases. 
In the light of the above, it is hard to overlook Lord Drummond Young’s 
observation that: “The concerns about the conditions of detention were based in large 
measure on the standards that would be required in a Scottish prison …” (2016, at 76) 
and, thus, within the jurisdiction of a Contracting State rather than in a third State. In 
Dean v. Lord Advocate, the majority interpreted the relevant law as it would have been 
applied within the jurisdiction of a Contracting State whereas Lord Drummond Young, 
in the minority, was prioritized the extra-territorial dimension of the case. The present 
author would argue that, in keeping with the tenor of the reasoning embraced by the 
Strasbourg Court in Ahmad, it cannot be correct that a third State must comply with 
ECHR standards in respect of behaviour which occurs within its jurisdiction, at least at 
a general level. To hold otherwise would mean that the Contracting State whose 
jurisdiction was engaged in a given case would, in effect, be exercising public authority 
within the territory of a State that was not a party to the European Convention.96 
Nevertheless, in cases where the non-refoulement principle is engaged, jurisdictional 
considerations must be tackled. Specifically, the courts of the requested State must 
determine the nature and extent of the danger posed to the individual concerned and 
whether that any such risk can be eliminated by reliable means. Consequently, any 
assessment about the risk of ill-treatment in extradition or expulsion cases must focus, 
                                                 
96 Article 1 of the ECHR provides that: ‘The High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within 
their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section I of this Convention.’ The Strasbourg Court 
declined to endorse an unqualified interpretation of the ECHR in extra-territorial situations. See 
Bankovic v. Belgium (2001) 44 EHRR SE5, [71]; and Al-Skeini v. UK (2011) 53 EHRR 18, [149].  
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predominantly, on the Applicant’s particular circumstances rather than on the general 
human rights situation in the requesting State. But while this approach is consistent 
with the reasoning adopted by the European Court in Othman, determinations are, 
evidently, difficult to make because the general human rights situation and the 
particular circumstances of a given individual are often closely intertwined, and this 
especially true on the facts of Dean v. Lord Advocate. It is suggested that the tension 
between the general and the particular in cases involving the non-refoulement 
principle may only be resolved if the responsible Contracting State undertakes a 
thorough investigation into how the requirements of Article 3 could be satisfied in the 
event of the Applicant’s extradition to the requesting State. The extent to which the UK 
government sought to ensure that Dean’s treatment would meet the rigorous 
requirements of Article 3, in the event of his extradition, will be examined in the next 
sub-section.            
 
4.2. The Lack Engagement by the UK Government  
One of the key aspects of the majority’s position was the lack of information in the 
public domain about prison condition in Taiwan. Lady Paton addressed this issue by 
saying that: “It seems that little is known in the United Kingdom about the conditions 
in which prisoners are held in Taiwan, and in particular, in Taipei prison” (2016, 40). 
Consequently, she expressed the view that the evidential hearing in 2016 had been 
“something of a voyage of discovery” (2016, 60). In contrast, Lord Drummond Young 
took the view that the UK government would be better informed about the desirability 
of entering into extradition arrangements with another government than the courts 
(2016, 66) However, Lady Paton questioned whether the UK government was, in fact, 
aware of the conditions prevailing in Taipei prison and that Dean’s Convention rights 
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were in danger of being breached as a consequence of his planned extradition to 
Taiwan in October 2013, when the MOU was concluded between the UK and ROC 
governments (2016, 60).  
In support of this contention, Lady Paton referred to a letter from the Home 
Office, dated 22 October 2014, confirming that an expert report had not been 
commissioned to investigate prison condition in Taiwan prior to the Home Secretary’s 
decision to conclude a MOU with the ROC for Dean’s extradition to Taiwan (2016, 10). 
The letter also stated that human rights considerations were a matter for the courts 
rather than the Home Secretary, as far as decisions about extradition were concerned 
(2016, 10). This is a rather startling assertion. While § 87 of the UK’s Extradition Act 
2003 makes it plain that the courts are under a duty to ensure that an Applicant’s 
Convention rights are protected in cases of extradition it is beyond doubt that all the 
organs of a Contracting State are bound by the obligations enshrined in the ECHR. 
Accordingly, the potential impact of the planned extradition for Dean’s Convention 
rights should have been part of the UK government’s assessment of whether to enter 
into an extradition arrangement with the ROC government. This was not a matter only 
for the courts. Lady Paton also drew attention to the limited nature of Dr McManus’s 
remit to assess conditions in Taipei prison. His terms of engagement were restricted 
to an assessment of conditions directly related to the Appellant (2016, 30). Further, 
she alluded to Dr McManus’s evidence that, for CPT assessment purposes, it was 
normal practice for an investigation into conditions in a particular prison to be far more 
comprehensive and robust in nature. He stated, typically, a team of at least six persons 
would be involved (including a qualifying medical doctor) and the process would 
ordinarily take several days in which the whole prison would be assessed and an 
overnight prison stay would be conducted. Dr McManus conducted a solo inspection 
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of Taipei prison over two days. He was not a medical doctor and no overnight 
inspection was carried out (2016, 30).  
Lady Clark went as far as to say that this restrictive approach to the 
investigation of the conditions in Taipei Prison was deliberate (2016, 111). During the 
2016 hearing, she said that the First Respondent had argued the Appeal Court should 
only have regard to the conditions in Taipei prison to the extent that they relates 
directly to the Appellant. However, the majority strongly disagreed with this approach: 
Lady Clark exclaimed that not only was the Court entitled to have regard to general 
prison conditions, it was bound to take them into account (2016, 112). She pursued 
the concern regarding access to reliable information about conditions in Taipei prison 
by expressing the view that the First Respondent could have led evidence to the Court 
by instructing an expert witness who had direct knowledge and experience of 
conditions in Taipei prison (2016, 111). Lady Clark complained that the absence of 
such evidence meant the Court had to piece the available evidence together for itself 
from a range of disparate and limited sources (2016, 111). Further, she characterised 
the efforts to make special arrangements for the Appellant in Taipei prison during the 
court proceedings as “various sporadic ad hoc proposals and undertakings “(2016, 
114). In her view, no-one with any understanding of the requirements of Article 3 in 
prison settings and knowledge of the system in operation at Taipei prison had thought 
through a way of creating an Article 3 compliant regime for Dean, assuming this was 
indeed possible (2016, 114).  
 In the circumstances, it is arguable that the UK government had not taken these 
extradition arrangements seriously notwithstanding its preparedness to conclude the 
MOU with the ROC government in the first place. Admittedly, this was a highly unusual 
case involving the conclusion of an MOU to extradite a single individual who had 
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committed a serious crime but one which did not have ramifications for national 
security. Nevertheless, it is arguable that British officials had not made the 
arrangements on a due diligence basis. The lack of a thorough initial assessment, by 
the Home Office, in association with the Foreign Office, regarding the implications of 
Dean’s extradition as far as his Convention rights were concerned, is particularly 
telling. The unwillingness to commission a full investigation into conditions in Taipei 
prison, in the context of the present Appeal, strengthens the overall impression that 
the UK government was not sufficiently engaged in this extradition case. In sharp 
contrast, in Othman, the UK government had taken considerable measures to ensure 
that the arrangements made for Othman’s extradition were comprehensive, detailed 
and cogent. For example, the diplomatic assurances contained in the material 
UK/Jordan MOU provided for the availability of judicial remedies for an extradited 
person in the event of allegations of mistreatment;97 the parties had agreed on the 
appointment of a credible, independent human rights organisation to monitor 
compliance with the undertakings which underpinned the extradition arrangements;98 
and, the UK government had provided substantial funds for the purpose of 
strengthening the capacity of human rights monitoring in Jordan more generally with 
a view to bringing about improvements in complying with human rights standards in 
the requesting State.99  
Once wider considerations are factored in, such as the fact that the UK and the 
ROC do not enjoy diplomatic ties and they are not partners for any significant broader 
purpose, the reasons for the UK government’s lack of commitment to the extradition 
arrangements it had concluded with the ROC become apparent. The UK government 
                                                 
97 The terms of this MOU are set out in Othman, supra note 40, [77]. 
98 Id. [80-82]. 
99 Id. [87]; and see Kate Jones, Deportations with Assurances: Addressing Key Criticisms 57 INT’L & 
COMP. L.Q.  183, 184 (2008). 
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was not sufficiently interested in developing its limited, informal relations with the ROC 
government to devise a strategy designed to address the obvious concerns regarding 
the arrangements for Dean’s extradition to Taiwan. When measured by the extradition 
arrangements entered into by the UK and Jordanian governments, as tested in the 
Othman case, the actions of the UK government in relation to Dean’s extradition, are 
clearly inadequate. British officials should have investigated conditions in Taipei prison 
thoroughly using a knowledgeable and experienced team of experts; they should have 
devised an Article 3 complaint regime for Dean and made detailed proposals and 
recommendations concerning the ways in which Dean could access other facilities 
within Taipei prison well in advance of the court proceedings; they should have 
ensured that appropriate independent monitoring arrangements were put in place; and 
a cogent complaints procedure should have been agreed between the parties 
(including the provision of judicial remedies). Evidently, diplomatic assurances were 
not sufficient to protect Dean against the prospect of ill-treatment, especially when 
judged by the actions of the parties to the UK/Jordanian MOU in Othman.  
 
4.3. The “Community Interests” Argument 
Lord Drummond Young highlighted the pivotal role that extradition arrangements play 
regarding the proper functioning of criminal justice regimes as they provide the means 
by which fugitives can be prevented from evading justice. Consequently, he thought 
that credible requests for extradition should only be refused in exceptional instances 
(2016, 64). Further, he suggested that, as the 2013 MOU constitutes an international 
agreement concluded between two governments, it should be assumed that diplomatic 
assurances contained therein would be carried out in good faith (2016, 65 & 67). The 
recognition of the community interests served by extradition has an established 
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pedigree in international law.100 In the context of the development of the non-
refoulement principle, it can be traced back to Soering, where the European Court 
observed that: 
 
“[…] inherent in the whole of the Convention is a search for a fair balance 
between the demands of the general interest of the community and the 
requirements of the protection of the individual’s fundamental rights. As 
movement about the world becomes easier and crime takes on a larger 
international dimension, it is increasingly in the interest of all nations that 
suspected offenders who flee abroad should be brought to justice. Conversely, 
the establishment of safe havens for fugitives would not only result in danger 
for the State obliged to harbour the protected person but also tend to undermine 
the foundations of extradition. These considerations must also be included 
among the factors to be taken into account in the interpretation and application 
of the notions of inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment in extradition 
cases” (2016, 89).101 
 
Nevertheless, it has been acknowledged that Contracting States are not permitted to 
engage in a balancing exercise when making decisions in extradition cases. 
Specifically, the Strasbourg Court has made it clear that they cannot weigh the risk 
that a given individual poses to the national interests of the Contracting State in issue 
(or to the broader international community) against the harm that he or she is likely to 
suffer in the event of extradition.102 The “risk versus harm” issue was revisited, in R 
                                                 
100 See Oppenheim, supra note 7, at 950-962. 
101 Also see Soering, supra note 39, [110]. 
102 See Chahal, supra note 54, [81]; and Saadi, supra note 50, [138]. 
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(Wellington) v Secretary of State for the Home Department, where the House of Lords 
held that the prospect of evading justice could constitute one of a number of factors 
when determining whether the risk of ill-treatment would satisfy the minimum level of 
severity of harm required for a breach of Article 3.103 However, this approach was 
overruled by the Strasbourg Court, in Ahmad, where it held that assessments 
concerning whether treatment satisfies the minimum severity threshold must remain 
separate from the reasons for seeking extradition.104 Accordingly, it is evident that 
“community interests” cannot influence determinations about whether the Convention 
rights of the individual in question would be jeopardised in the event of extradition.105  
In the light of the above, it is clear that Lord Drummond Young’s view of the way in 
which extradition requests should be treated was not consistent with the current 
Strasbourg jurisprudence on this issue.  
 
4.4. MOUs, Diplomatic Assurances and International Law  
Lord Drummond Young expressed the view that any doubts concerning Taiwan’s 
international status would increase the chances that the undertakings would be 
honoured, as the ROC had much to gain by proving that it was prepared to deliver on 
the extradition arrangements contained in the 2013 MOU, and in subsequent 
undertakings. He sought to harness the authority of international law in this regard by 
holding that: 
  
                                                 
103 The majority view in Wellington was espoused by Lord Hoffmann, supra note 66, [22-24]. 
104 Ahmad, supra note 55, [172]. In that case, the Court declared that: “Indeed in the 22 years since the 
Soering judgment, in an art.3 case the Court has never undertaken an examination of the proportionality 
of a proposed extradition or other form of removal from a contracting state. To this extent, the Court 
must be taken to have departed from the approach contemplated at [89] and [110] of the Soering 
judgment [173].” 
105 See R (EM (Eritrea)) v.Secretary of State for the Home Department [2014] 2 WLR 409, [41‑43] and 
[58‑64]; and Florea, supra note 81, [32].  
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“As with any agreement at an international level, an extradition agreement takes 
effect as a matter of international law. While obviously the enforcement of 
international law presents much greater difficulties than the equivalent in 
domestic law, the extent to which a state observes its international obligations 
or fails to do so can be monitored by diplomatic and consular staff. If it becomes 
clear that a state is failing to implement its international undertakings, it is likely 
that other states will be reluctant to conclude agreements with it in future, which 




“The Memorandum of Understanding is an international agreement between 
states, having force in international law, and the assurances subsequently 
given by the Taiwanese government are supplemental to that agreement and 
similarly have force in international law (2016, 81).”  
 
The 2013 MOU, concluded between the UK and ROC governments, which enabled 
extradition proceedings to be instituted, via § 194 of the Extradition Act 2003, and 
which prompted Dean’s challenge to the legality of the special arrangements that were 
put in place with a view to extraditing him to Taiwan, were concerned with the 
application of UK law. However, as Lord Drummond Young’s Opinion shows, the 
effects this arrangement at the international level must also be considered.  
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Although typically governed by treaty arrangements extradition can be effected 
through other means, including resort to MOUs.106 However, it is widely believed that 
MOUs are not treaties as they do not manifest an intention to create international legal 
rights and obligations.107 Consequently, it has been suggested that these political 
arrangements are not “governed by international law” in accordance with the definition 
of a treaty enshrined in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.108 
Nonetheless, Klabbers has argued that MOUs should be interpreted as treaties and 
the intention that they generate legally binding rights and obligations should be 
presumed.109 Arguably, the popularity of MOUs has troubling ramifications for the 
normative reach of international law because it creates ambiguity concerning the 
proper scope of treaty law,110 which in certain cases, may only be resolved when a 
given agreement of arrangement falls to be interpreted by a court or tribunal.111 
Notwithstanding these significant criticisms, Klabbers has recently changed his 
position on the legal status of MOUs. He is now prepared to concede that MOUs are 
not treaties as such. Instead he prefers to draw attention to their “twilight” character 
(or soft law) while admitting that their use may stem from an intention to generate 
political obligations, but he claims that their interrelationship with international law 
                                                 
106 Member States of the British Commonwealth effect extradition through the use of MOUs. See the 
2002 London Scheme, http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/mesicic3_jam_london.pdf (Last visited 
Jan.16, 2017). 
107 See J. Fawcett, The Legal Character of International Agreements 30 British Yearbook of 
International Law 381 399 (1953); and Anthony Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice (2nd ed. CUP 
2007), chapter 3. 
108 See Aust, id. 20-21. Article 2(1)(a) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that: 
“’treaty’ means an international agreement concluded between States in written form and governed by 
international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and 
whatever its particular designation.” 23 May 1969, (1969) 8 I.L.M. 679, (1980) 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. 
109 See Jan Klabbers, The Concept of Treaty in International Law (Kluwer Law International 1996), 105-
118. See Aust, id. 49-52.  
110 Aust admits that the growing popularity of MOUs is not without its problems: he notes that “the use 
of MOUs is now so widespread, some officials may see the MOU as the norm, a treaty being used only 
when it cannot be avoided”. Id. 32. 
111 See, for instance, Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions (Jurisdiction) Case (Qatar/Bahrain) 
(1994) I.C.J. Rep 112. 
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remains latent.112 In any event, MOUs are particularly useful as a means of entering 
into arrangements within non-State entities and the ROC has concluded numerous 
MOUs with a wide range of States that do not recognise it as a de jure State or 
government.113 But while the use of MOUs by States in their dealings with Taiwan has 
enabled political and commercial relationships to be forged, and strengthened, without 
direct reference to international law, recourse to such devices hides the legal quality 
of such arrangements and casts doubt on the influence that international law exerts in 
such an exceptional context. 
Despite the orthodox view that MOUs are not be legally binding per se, it 
understood that they may have legal consequences, both at the level of international 
law and in municipal litigation.114 As far as Contracting States are concerned, 
extradition cases invariably involve consideration of the need to discharge certain 
obligations imposed on the requested State by virtue of the ECHR, including the 
principle of non-refoulement, under Article 3, and standards concerning fair trial 
pursuant to Article 6. The legal obligations, imposed by the ECHR, are binding on 
Contracting States vis-à-vis individuals coming within their jurisdiction, under Article 1 
of the Convention, despite the absence of an inter-State character.115 Accordingly, it 
is arguable that the 2013 ROC/UK MOU generated legal effects for the UK 
government, pursuant to its legal obligations under the ECHR, notwithstanding this 
MOU’s status as a political arrangement. Nevertheless, such obligations would only 
be satisfied, in Dean v. Lord Advocate, if the UK government (and the UK courts) had 
conducted rigorous outward-looking assessments of Taiwan’s municipal legal system 
and the integrity of the undertakings given by the ROC government in order to 
                                                 
112 See Jan Klabbers, International Law (CUP 2013), 43-45.  
113 Aust, supra note 107, 47 and 61. 
114 Id. 53-57. 
115 The terms of Article 1 of the ECHR are quoted at supra note 96. 
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establish whether Dean’s Convention rights had been breached. In addition, as 
discussed above, diplomatic assurances do not possess an international legal quality, 
they too amount to political commitments. However, again, it is arguable that they give 
rise to legal effects in a similar manner to the way in which MOUs may have legal 
significance. But, notwithstanding their capacity to generate legal effects, it would be 
misleading to characterise MOUs and diplomatic assurances as deriving their force 
from international law per se.  
Against this background, Lord Drummond Young seems to have engaged in a 
somewhat crude assessment of the advantages that may be gained by the ROC 
government if it complied with the political commitments set out in the 2013 MOU, and 
the subsequent diplomatic assurances (i.e. it may demonstrate to the international 
community that the ROC is a reliable partner and it could improve bilateral relations in 
any event).116 In his view, the advantages that may accrue to the ROC from honouring 
the MOU would outweigh the risks of non-compliance. Consequently, in Lord 
Drummond Young’s mind, it was more likely that the ROC would be dependable, as 
far as Dean’s treatment was be concerned. However, the significance of such an 
assessment for international law (or for the other legal regimes engaged by the case) 
is unclear and Lord Drummond Young’s musings about the likelihood of political 
compliance are susceptible to the charge of “optimism”.117 This situation highlights the 
practical problems, which may arise from the use of non-legal mechanisms, such as 
MOUs and diplomatic assurances, in general but these normative difficulties are 
                                                 
116 In response to the Edinburgh District Court’s favourable first instance decision in Dean v Lord 
Advocate, the ROC’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a press release stating that: “the extradition 
decision is a fine example of judicial justice being upheld and sets a positive precedent in Taiwan-UK 
judicial cooperation. In the future, the two sides can use this precedent to further strengthen bilateral 
cooperation in not only judicial matters, but also other areas of mutual concern. See Press Release 
Number 124, issued by the Public Diplomacy Coordination Council on 11 June 2014. 
http://www.mofa.gov.tw/EnMobile/News_Content.aspx?s=67715224F31167E9 (last visited Jan.16, 
2017) 
117 Lady Clark, 2016 judgment, supra note 1, [116]. 
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heightened by the doubts surrounding Taiwan’s international legal status. Thus while 
the 2013 ROC/UK MOU, and the subsequent ROC undertakings, may generate legal 
effects for the UK, via its own municipal law, and through the ECHR they do not create 
international legal rights and obligations of an at the level of general international law. 
As a result, it is unclear how the key (non-legal) devices – the 2013 MOU and the 
subsequent diplomatic assurances – have legal effect as far as the ROC in Taiwan is 
concerned: their reliability is open to question from the perspective of general 
international law.118   
  
5. Conclusion 
The two judgments delivered by the Scottish Court of Appeal in the case of Dean v. 
Lord Advocate offer a series of fascinating insights into the interpretation and 
interaction of municipal law, the jurisprudence of the European Convention on Human 
Rights and international law in a difficult setting. Despite the finding that the ROC 
qualified as a “territory” pursuant to the application of § 194 of the 2003 Act, in its 2015 
judgment, in the 2016 Judgment the majority doubted the practical significance of the 
ROC’s diplomatic assurances in the light of the general conditions prevailing in Taipei 
prison. In reaching its decision, the majority seemed to be determined to apply 
Convention standards to Taipei prison and it was not swayed by the relativist 
interpretation favoured by Lord Drummond Young in his dissenting Opinion. Further, 
the UK government’s approach to the task of satisfying the requirements of Article 3 
in the context of Dean’s planned incarceration in Taipei prison was inadequate. It did 
not engage fully with the ROC government, and its prison authorities, on this issue, 
                                                 
118 One way in which political agreements and understandings can have effect in international law is via 
the principle of estoppel. See Chagos Marine Protected Area Arbitration (Mauritius v. United Kingdom) 
Award (18 March 2015). However, estoppel clearly has no application to the present situation.    
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especially when compared with the way that the UK government worked with the 
Jordanian government (and human rights organisations) in the Othman case to 
produce a meaningful arrangement that sought to protect the rights of any affected 
individuals.  
The 2013 ROC/UK MOU and the prospect of Dean’s extradition, following the 
Appeal Court’s 2015 decision, were widely viewed in Taiwan as signs of the ROC’s 
developing relations with the international community. However, in the 2016 judgment, 
concerns about Taiwan’s political isolation from the international community 
reasserted themselves. In particular, the majority were troubled by the lack of 
independent monitoring of Dean’s treatment as a means of ensuring that the ROC’s 
diplomatic assurances were upheld and the absence of international monitoring of 
prison conditions in Taiwan given the limited protection that could be provided by 
British officials stationed in Taipei. It might be tempting to see the outcome in the case 
of Dean v. Lord Advocate in negative terms. However, by initiating the extradition 
arrangements with the UK government, via the 2013 MOU, the ROC government 
prevented Dean from evading justice: he was kept in custody in a Scottish prison for 
the duration of the present court proceedings. As Lady Paton noted, Dean actually 
spent longer in prison than he would have done if he had received a four-year sentence 
for a crime committed within the UK’s jurisdiction (2016, 60). This outcome shows that 
the community impulses underpinning extradition remain strong notwithstanding the 
need for Contracting States to ensure that extradition arrangements comply with the 
ECHR’s provisions. Moreover, despite the significant concerns about the character of 
MOUs and diplomatic assurances from the perspective of international law, the fact 
that doubts about Taiwan’s international legal status did not stop the conclusion of the 
2013 extradition arrangement, supports the existence of an inclusive conception of 
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community interests and a rudimentary commitment to the (international) rule of law 
even though those extradition arrangements were imperfectly realised in the present 
case.        
